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Abstract

This thesis investigates how and why U.S. policies and agencies are ill-equipped to
respond to narco-terrorism and offers some policy recommendations for remedying that.
Narco-terrorism is the merging of terrorism and drug trafficking. Terrorist organizations
and narcotics traffickers each have much to offer the other; there is potential for
symbiosis in the form of cooperation and even hybridization. Examination of the
dynamics between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers, combined with an
evaluation of the US responses to narcoterrorism in Colombia and Afghanistan, makes it
clear that current US policy responses fail to recognize narcoterrorism as a unique
challenge, and instead attempt to deal separately with terrorism and drug trafficking. This
approach has the potential to actually worsen both situations. The US needs a
narcoterrorism strategy and institutions in place to implement it.
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Introduction:

In 2017, Politico published a thirty-page exposé about why the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) mission, Project Cassandra, failed to combat Hezbollah’s affiliations in
the international drug trade.1 Project Cassandra, in the eight years of its operation from
2008 to 2016, collected evidence that tied Hezbollah to the drug trade stretching from the
Middle East to Latin America. The DEA mission ultimately disbanded after its decline as
a policy priority, loss of funding, and jurisdiction difficulties. The story broke headlines
outside of Politico, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) responded with pledging “to
ensure that all Project Cassandra investigations as well as other related investigations” are
reviewed by “the Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team (HFNT), a group of
experienced international narcotics trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, and money
laundering prosecutors.”2
The DEA’s Project Cassandra and the Justice Department’s HFNT are efforts to
combat a vital funding resource for terrorists: the international production and sale of
narcotics. Both activities, the narcotics trade and terrorism, are national security concerns
for the U.S. Given that these two security concerns can overlap, such as in the case of
Hezbollah, U.S. policymaking institutions must prioritize a mission set to address that

1

Josh Meyer, “The Secret Backstory of How Obama Let Hezbollah Off the Hook,” Politico, 2017,
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-trafficking-investigation/.
2
Jeff Sessions, “Attorney-General Sessions Announces Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team,”
The United States Department of Justice, January 11, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorneygeneral-sessions-announces-hezbollah-financing-and-narcoterrorism-team.
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circumstance. Right now, counternarcotics and counterterrorism each involve different
agencies and associated actors, operating with different goals and programs in mind.
This overlap in security concerns predates Project Cassandra and Hezbollah’s
affiliation with drug trafficking. The linkages between terrorists and the drug trade,
narco-terrorism, surfaced in policy agendas as early as forty years ago, as policymakers
recognized anti-government paramilitaries and narcotics traffickers operating in a shared
space. Narcoterrorism implies that both security concerns, narcotics and terrorism, bring
their societal vices to the overlap.3
Narco-terrorism is a global phenomenon. From the cocaine trade affiliation of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) in Colombia, to Hezbollah’s production of
Captagon in the Levant, to the Taliban’s networks in the market in Asia, the bonds
between terrorism and narcotics markets are widespread. These bonds exist in various
forms, depending on the actors involved. Benefits of association go both ways: terrorist
organizations can offer protective services to the cultivation of drug crops and institutions
that launder drug profits for drug traders; for example, facilitating cross-border
transportation, and more, while drug trafficking can be a source of funding for terrorist
groups, either through taxation, collaboration, or coercion.
National security policies and strategies face trade- offs when attempting to
address these linkages between terrorism and narcotics. The U.S. vests its security
interests in the health and protection of its citizens, meaning that it must reduce the flow
of illegal drugs and prevent, deter, and defend against terrorism. But while drug
traffickers and terrorists may work together, combating each may require different,
3

Ibid.
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sometimes incompatible, strategies. For example, in the case of terrorists providing
protection to crop harvesting, the U.S. might be implementing counternarcotics programs
in rural villages without also tackling terrorist control over the locality. But, working to
eradicate the local farmers’ source of sustenance, the U.S.’s counternarcotics strategy
alienates farmers, creates demand for local protection, and thus allows for the spread of a
terrorist organization’s power and influence. On the other hand, there are circumstances
in which prioritizing counterterrorism operations over counternarcotics programs means
that terrorists can continue to turn to the trade as a lucrative source of funding.
This thesis will examine the challenge the U.S. faces when terrorism and drug
trafficking overlap. First, it will explore the nature of the terrorist-drug trafficker
relationship, which has been variously described as symbiotic, competitive, and a hybrid.
The thesis will also propose recommendations for future policy to effectively address the
threat.
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Literature Review:

In a 1982 speech, Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry coined the term
“narco-terrorism… the union of the vice of narcotics with the violence of terrorism.”4
The needs of terrorist organizations and drug traffickers create the potential for a
symbiotic relationship: terrorists can fund their operations through narcotics sales and
gain regional legitimacy, and narcotics traffickers can work with terrorists to undermine
state control and take advantage of anarchy.
A variety of potential relationships between narcotics traffickers and terrorists
exist. These relationships can be competitive in nature, symbiotic, and even describe a
developing hybrid. Relationships in which either narcotics traffickers or terrorists benefit
from the existence of the other is a symbiosis. The symbiosis includes instances of
cooperation by belligerents when they work together to meet each others’ needs. In some
forms of a symbiosis, the two belligerents compete for supremacy and a disproportionate
control of profits. Competition can drive the belligerents to coopt each others’ tactics in
striving for control of the other. Eventually, the relationship can reflect deeper ties
between belligerents as they formulate a hybrid organization. This transition is critical as
it is no longer constructed upon the efforts and benefits of different parties, but rather
denotes when efforts and benefits become concerned with one hybrid actor. In other
words, the two different frameworks for motivations and benefits of the two actors in the

4

John E. Thomas, “Narco-terrorism: Could the Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses Threaten Our Civil
Liberties?” Washington and Lee Law Review, May
2010, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/66-4ThomasNote.pdf.
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symbiosis ultimately fuse into one framework in a hybrid threat. This hybridization runs
counter to the U.S. conventional wisdom: targeting one threat will sever the symbiosis
and cause the other threat to decline.
Either party can begin the symbiosis in a number of ways and a number of
motivations can prompt the survival of the symbiosis. Scholars discuss the various
avenues of initiation and debate which of the motivations reign supreme.
The relationship begins in a variety of ways. In some cases, a narcotics market
already exists in a space where a terrorist organization intends to spread its influence. In
these cases, the initiation of the symbiotic relationship can occur through coercion or
negotiation. The FARC used a coercive initiation approach with cocaine traffickers in
Colombia. The FARC conducted an offensive militant campaign against traffickers to
attain dominance over narcotics organizations and their production territories.5
Negotiated initiations also occur. In Peru, the Shining Path terrorist organization offered
protection services to the cocaine farming communities of the Huallaga Valley in
exchange for resources and popular support.6
In rare cases, terrorist organizations will target a demand for a product and begin
producing narcotics in-house, then trafficking around the world. For example, Hezbollah
saw a demand for amphetamines in the Middle East and began producing and trafficking
Captagon, making tremendous profits.7 Captagon is a newer, powerful stimulant drug

5

Paul Rexton Kan, Drug Trafficking and International Security (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield, 2016),
36.
6
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War On Drugs (Washington D.C.: The
Brooking Institution, 2010), 41.
7
Josh Meyer, “The Secret Backstory of How Obama Let Hezbollah Off the Hook,” Politico, accessed
December 6, 2018, https://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-traffickinginvestigation/.
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used by Syrian fighters and Arab youth in the region.8 In other cases, the initiation can be
a product of circumstance, wherein terrorists or narcotics traffickers benefit from a power
vacuum left behind by the other. A power vacuum is an anarchical space left behind
when a governing power topples; creating conditions ripe for conflict and the succession
of a new power. During Operation Enduring Freedom, for example, the relationship
between the Taliban and traffickers morphed. The suppression of the Taliban allowed
opium traffickers to gain supremacy and occupy the space relinquished by the Taliban.9
Academics debate which motivations breathe life into the narco-terrorist
relationship. One school of thought is that the needs of terrorist organizations dictate the
behavior of the relationship. Another is that, instead, the interests of narcotic trafficking
organizations drive the relationship and the forms it takes. Paul Rexton Kan of the U.S.
Army War College falls into the first school of thought. He argues that terrorist
organizations respond to the potential of the symbiosis by selecting their resources “based
on six criteria: quantity, legitimacy, security, reliability, control, and simplicity.”10 Illegal
drugs meet all of these. Drug supply is not subject to the threat of shortage as it is low
cost and simple to produce through cultivation. The profits of the drug trade are made
legitimate through laundering. The drug trade is a secure and reliable source of funding
due to its steady and massive scale of demand. The U.N. International Drug Control

8

Ibid.
Christopher J. Coyne, Abigail R. Hall Blanco, and Scott Burns. "The War on Drugs in Afghanistan:
Another Failed Experiment with Interdiction." The Independent Review 21, no. 1 (Summer, 2016): 95-119.
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1798786156?accountid=10141.
10
Paul Rexton Kan, Drug Trafficking and International Security (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield, 2016),
106.
9
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Program estimates the global trade to retail annually around $300 to $500 billion, making
it dependably lucrative for terrorist organizations.11
The research of retired Air Force Colonel Jennifer L. Hesterman also falls into
this school of thought. In The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus, Hesterman describes how drug
profits fit terrorist organizations’ needs: “Terrorist organizations need money and
resources not only to carry out an operation but perhaps most importantly to recruit,
maintain safe havens, train, travel, take care of day-to-day expenses, and in some groups,
provide for the families of dead martyrs.”12 Amanda Leu of the Joint Forces Quarterly
explains that terrorist organizations enter bonds with drug traffickers as “terrorist
organizations are increasingly using drug trafficking as a means to fund operations…
These groups operate under different leadership and usually their end goals are not the
same; however, they do carry out many of the same functions through organized crime”
to protect product and create profit.13
However, another strain of thought reverses the relationship, contending that the
interests of narcotics traffickers drive the behavior of the symbiosis. In her book,
Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, Vanda Felbab-Brown regards
protection from government intervention as a main requirement of drug traffickers:
“Crucially, governments frequently feel obliged to destroy the illicit economy, thus

11

The U.N. International Drug Control Program, The Social and Economic Impact of Drug Abuse and
Control (Vienna: UNDCP, 1994): 29
12
Jennifer Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus (Boca Raton: CRC Press: Taylor & Francis Group,
2013), 167.
13
Amanda Leu, “Fighting Narcoterrorism,” Joint Forces Quarterly, January
2008, http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/detail?vid=9&sid=a6706ebe-dc76-4d8b99bb5db11c3a2e12%40sessionmgr4008&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=aph&A
N=31391038
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allowing belligerents to offer themselves as its protectors and obtain the support of the
local population that depends on the illicit economy.”14 Felbab-Brown claims that
because narcotics traffickers require protection before the initiation of a symbiosis,
narcotics traffickers and their needs are the precursor threat.
Michael Durnan and Mark Peceny of the University of New Mexico agree, and
identify drug traffickers’ need for protection from the police threat: “The coercive
military and police activities… often determine which set of private actors in which
countries benefit the most from the drug trade;” compelling narcotics traffickers to
maintain their position in the market through acquiring protective services.15 Also
recognizing the police threat drug traffickers face, Kelly Hanen of the University of
Texas discusses how “cartels frequently use explosives, firearms, and other dangerous
weapons [they acquired from terrorist organizations]… this control allows cartels to
achieve monetary gains.”16. The narcotics traffickers use the weaponry to defend their
crop from local police forces and other competitors. Alex Schmid of the UN Office on
Drugs and Crime describes how narcotics traffickers “use tactics of terror…to disrupt
investigations; to deter…vigorous government policies; to eliminate effective law
enforcement officials… [and] create an environment more conductive to criminal

14

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War On Drugs (Washington D.C.: The
Brooking Institution, 2010), 3.
15
Peceny, Mark and Michael Durnan. "The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening
of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s." Latin American Politics and Society 48, no. 2 (Summer, 2006): 95IV.
16
Kelly Hanen. "Doubling Down: Why Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations Should Be Designated As
Foreign Terrorist Organizations and As Significant Narcotics Traffickers." American Journal of Criminal
Law 43, no. 2 (2016)
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activity.”17 Narcotics traffickers gain these skill sets in terror and intimidation tactics
from the example of respective regional terrorist organizations.
There is a third school of thought: symbiosis leads to hybridization, whether
through collaboration or cooperation. Terrorists who cultivate and transport drugs and
launder profits, are essentially drug traffickers. Concurrently, drug traders sharing profits
with terrorist organizations support terrorism. Senior Policy Analyst for the Library of
Congress Raphael Francis Perl references the blurring lines between narcotics traffickers
and terrorists: “The links between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations are well
documented… beyond the rule of law, the criminal world, the drug-trafficking world, and
the terrorist world merge. The line between them is becoming increasingly difficult to
draw.”18 Colin Clarke of Carnegie Mellon University views the blurred lines as the seeds
to a more grim threat: “In these cases, criminality (and the violence that often
accompanies criminality) helps fund the insurgency and groups can morph over time into
criminal-insurgent hybrids.”19 Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson of the Washington
Institute quantify this: “up to 60 percent of terror organizations are suspected of being
connected in some fashion with the illegal narcotics trade. As FTOs [Foreign Terrorist
Organizations] become more heavily involved in the drug trade, the DEA and others have
begun to identify such terrorist groups as ‘hybrid organizations’.”20

17

Alex P. Schmid. "Links between terrorism and drug trafficking: a case of narcoterrorism?." International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, January 27 (2005).
18
Raphael Francis Perl, “Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists” (lecture, DEA Headquarters, Arlington,
Virginia, December 4, 2001), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=3250
19
Colin Clarke, “Drugs,” Journal of Strategic Study 9, no. 3
(2016), https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=
1&article=1536&context=jss.
20
Michael Braun, “Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?” (lecture
presented at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., July 18, 2008).
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus92.pdf ,
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Svante Cornell of Johns Hopkins University explains the significance of such
merging. She says that “the most dangerous impact of the link between narcotics and
conflict is the potential for changing motivational structures within” the partnering
terrorist organizations and drug traffickers.21 The shift in motivational structures
increases overlap in motivations. As a step in the hybridization process, this increases
bonds between terrorists and narcotics traffickers. Christina Liang of the Geneva Centre
for Security Policy regards this proliferation of linkages as reason that “terrorism and
transnational organized crime can no longer be studied in isolation… groups are
transforming into new crime-terror groups displaying the characteristics of both.”22 Liang
explains that hybrid groups share recruitment methods, fear tactics, and training styles.
She and her peers assert that, in some scenarios, this “symbiosis of crime and terror is
making them both more powerful: terrorists are benefitting from the revenue of criminal
activities and organized criminals are using terrorist tactics to gain political power.”23
The transition from a symbiotic relationship to a hybridization is of immense concern as
it essentially thwarts the current efforts of U.S. counternarcotic and counterterrorism
policies.
The existence of the nexus and the threat of hybridization negates the logic of
U.S. counternarcotic and counterterrorism policy. James Piazza of Penn State University
gives three hypotheses that exemplify the conventional logic of U.S. policy: “Higher

21

Svante E. Cornell. "The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 6 (11,
2005): 751-760. doi:http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0022343305057895.
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/213129737?accountid=10141.
22
Christina Liang, “Shadow Networks: The Growing Nexus of Terrorism and Organised Crime,” Geneva
Centre for Security Policy, September
2011, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/133082/Policy%20Paper%2020.pdf.
23
Ibid.
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illicit drug prices yield higher rates of terrorism… Higher rates of illicit drugs crop
production/cultivation will yield higher rates of terrorism… Higher rates of drug crop
eradication and drug product interdiction will yield lower rates of terrorism.”24 Through
application of his three hypotheses, Piazza asserts that the success of “drug eradication
and interdiction strategies are significant predictors of domestic and international
terrorism” declining.25 This logic, that combatting one threat will eliminate the other,
runs counter to the reality of the symbiotic relationship and subsequent threat of
hybridization. As demonstrated by past policy responses, the U.S. conventional wisdom
fails because the U.S. cannot effectively address either threat while the threat exists in
relation to the other.

24

James A. Piazza, “The Illicit Drug Trade, Counternarcotics Strategies and Terrorism,” Public Choice:
JSTOR, December 2011, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41483738?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
25
Ibid.
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U.S. Policy Responses:

The U.S.’s declarations of the War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism inherently
delineate our enemies as mutually exclusive. In 2001, the Bush Administration affirmed
that the War on Terror would not end “until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped, and defeated.”26 Bush both designated the enemy, and failed to designate
explicitly the name and specific members comprising the enemy. This made it impossible
to implement a coherent strategy and coordinate agencies to target the influence of
terrorist organizations since the full breadth of terrorist activities and tactics was not
recognize. In order to combat narco-terrorists effectively, the U.S. policy- making
process must harmonize U.S. agencies.
Two aspects of the U.S.’s decision-making and prioritizing processes drive
national security policy: “an uncertain threat environment and the timing of policy.”27
The perceived size of given threats warrant different approaches in the policy-making
processes. However, the U.S. approaches definitive and uncertain threats with the same
policy-making process. The U.S.’s policy-making process evolved out of the Cold War,
when the threat was large, viewed as existential, but both stable and well-defined. This
Cold War-era policy-making process was built to focus on countering the influence and
expansion of communism. Because the U.S. focused its defense efforts on countering the

26

George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People” (Capitol Hill,
Washington D.C., September 20, 2001), https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
27
William Newmann, Managing National Security Policy: The President and the Process (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 207.
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rise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. designed the current policy-making process to combat a
large existential threat in the form of a peer force defined by borders. Because of this, the
national security policy-making process is inherently neo-realist. The U.S. continues to
use this narrow frame of reference and apply the same policy-making process in a world
with more nuanced and numerous threats by non-state actors.28
The timing of policy refers to the window of time when a policy interest makes
the top of the national security agenda, and the time it takes to implement a policy
targeting that interest.
The duration of interagency processes extends this window in the timing of
policy. This window could outlive the relevance of a certain policy as it passes through
the channels of the interagency process. This suggests “that the policy needs of the
moment could not be satisfied by the standard interagency process.”29 The standard
interagency process includes the struggles to push interests to the top of the agenda.
Bureaus within departments and departments within the government alike fight for the
chance to act on their own interests and “if difficulty creating consensus among different
factions within a department exists, the pressures on the executive of that department to
modify the process should be present.”30 Matching the intended U.S. policy response
with the speed of our enemies requires formulating a standard interagency process that
addresses the window of policy timing.
Matching the timing of policy with the window of policy relevancy, and
understanding an uncertain threat ought to be priorities of the policy-making process that

28

Ibid.
Ibid, 208.
30
Ibid, 211.
29
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coordinates counternarcotics and counterterrorism agencies and addresses the threat of
the narco-terrorist symbiosis.
Although cases emerge in which a narco-terrorist symbiosis creates a hybrid
threat, the U.S. organizes its policy to address them as independent and separate threats
with two discrete missions: counterterrorism and counternarcotics. According to Jonathan
Caulkins, Mark Kleiman, and Peter Reuter of the Belfer Center at Harvard University,
counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations differ in “the scale of activity to be
suppressed; the structure of the organizations whose schemes we must try to foil; the
motivations of their participants; the scale, structure, and direction of the related financial
transactions; and the tolerance for failure.”31
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), in Joint Publication 3-26, designates
counterterrorism operations as activities “to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and
networks… countering root causes and [achieving] desired regional end states from the
definition.”32 The main U.S. government bodies that perform counterterrorism operations
are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Justice Department, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Department of State (DOS)Bureau of Counterterrorism, National
Counterterrorism Center, the Armed Forces, and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).33 The CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) functions as both an operational and
analytic mission within the agency as it “targets terrorist leaders and cells, disrupts their

31

Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A. R. Kleiman, and Peter Reuter, “Lessons of The,” The Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, June 2002,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/lessons_of_the_war_on_drugs_for_the_wa
r_on_terrorism.pdf.
32
Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 13,
2009, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_26.pdf.
33
“Terrorism,” Penn State University Libraries, October 9,
2018, http://guides.libraries.psu.edu/c.php?g=582994&p=4025429#s-lg-box-12491607.
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plots, [and] severs their financial and logistical links.”34 The Justice Department’s
Counterterrorism Section (CTS), outside of the FBI, focuses on “investigating and
prosecuting domestic and international terrorism cases,… terrorist financing matters,
including material support cases; participating in the systematic collection and analysis of
data and information relating to the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases,…
formulating legislative initiatives and DOJ policies and guidelines relating to terrorism”
and more.35 The FBI holds jurisdiction over “specific terrorism-related offenses, such as
violence at airports, money laundering, [and] attacks on U.S. officials.”36 The DOS
Bureau of Counterterrorism “designs, manages, and oversees foreign assistance to build
the civilian capabilities of foreign government partners” to carry out their own
counterterrorism missions.37 The National Counterterrorism Center under the Director of
National Intelligence manages “a Joint Operations Center” to “provide an interagency
forum and supporting process to link national-level counterterrorism policy to strategic
operational objectives and tasks.”38 The US Armed Forces, both conventional and Special
Operations, “use CT capabilities in a wide variety of combat and noncombat situations to
build a cohesive CT operation” and to assist host nations “to build indigenous capabilities
that deter terrorist acts.”39

34

Spotlight On CIA's Centers, Central Intelligence Agency, July 2014, https://www.cia.gov/newsinformation/featured-story-archive/2014-featured-story-archive/spotlight-on-cias-centers.html.
35
“Counterterrorism Section,” The United States Department of Justice, July 23,
2014, https://www.justice.gov/nsd/counterterrorism-section.
36
“What Is the Fbi's Role in Combating Terrorism?,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed November
29, 2018, https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-the-fbis-role-in-combating-terrorism.
37
“Programs and Initiatives,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 29,
2018, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm.
38
“What We Do,” The National Counterterrorism Center, accessed November 29,
2018, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-what-we-do.
39
“Joint Publication: Counterterrorism,” Joint Chiefs of Staff 3, no. 26 (October 24,
2014), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_26.pdf.
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The variety of agencies involved in the counterterrorism mission set arises from
the U.S.’s need to adapt its functions to the threat of terrorism. Over time, counterterrorist
actors proliferated as the U.S. legislature passed new measures and programs. As the
nature of terrorist threats morph and evolve both domestically and abroad, the U.S.
responds with updated programs and new entities to implement those updates. “Although
as many as 30 or more Federal agencies” may be involved with counterterrorism, each
serves a specific function in a specific mission. However, these missions sometimes
conflict with one another. In these instances, the U.S. will employ interagency
organizations in an attempt “to assure that the various operational programs [deal] with
terrorist attempts, including intelligence and incident management, are effective.”40 These
interagency working groups pursue streamlining agency jurisdictions, but also add to the
proliferation of entities.
Meanwhile, the DoD defines counternarcotics as a mission set that addresses
“illicit drug trafficking, but [can] also include countering illicit financial flows and the
illicit trafficking of people, wildlife, natural resources, and weapons.”41 In 1988,
Congress enacted the National Drug Control Policy to “enhance national drug control
planning and coordination” efforts within the departments and agencies of the
Executive.42 The National Drug Control Policy programs are implanted within “the
Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland
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Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State,
Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs.”43 These programs include domestic and
international counternarcotics operations spread throughout the Executive. In the Justice
Department specifically, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and teams of special prosecutors conduct counternarcotics. The DEA’s
mission, specifically, is “to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the
United States… [and reduce] the availability of and demand for illicit controlled
substances on the domestic and international markets.”44 The CIA Crime and Narcotics
Center and the Armed Forces also carry out counternarcotics operations in conjunction
with the programs outlined in the National Drug Control Policy.45
This vast distribution of resources across over thirty federal agencies proves to be
counterproductive due to its lack of responsiveness in a bureaucratic structure.46 This is
because the rigidity of bureaucratic hierarchies impedes counternarcotics agencies’
ability to react to the narcotics traffickers’ pace of activities. Also, the resources exist in
this hierarchical structure that includes precinct jurisdictions. Precinct jurisdictions
impose physical borders on law enforcement entities both domestically and
internationally. These precinct jurisdictions are problematic to counternarcotics
operations as narcotics traffickers “exploit borders to their advantage” and do not
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constrain their illicit activities to political boundaries.47 Precinct jurisdictions require
another layer of cooperation: coherence of action between multiple groups who possess
authority over the enforcement of law in restricted spaces. Authorities must continuously
sync and work together to target a fluid and moving threat. However, few mechanisms
exist to promote precinct jurisdiction cooperation; making the process slow and difficult
to arrange.
The nature of the narco-terrorist symbiosis involving non-state actors allows
narco-terrorists to defy national sovereignty, achieve their goals, and avoid the
comparably slow reaction of U.S. bureaucracy. Traditionally, the FBI, DEA, and other
domestically focused agencies and their missions must yield to the CIA, and military
operations. For example, as the FBI and the DEA may seek to prosecute a narcotics
trafficking organization, this narcotics trafficking organization may participate in terrorist
activity; rendering this case now to the concern of the Armed Forces and the CIA. While
the U.S. bureaucracy contains agencies that function to contend with components of the
symbiosis, the agencies are not coordinated within or across missions effectively.
Counternarcotics entities and counterterrorism entities thus approach the symbiosis from
different angles with different intents rather than responding in a coordinated effort. The
following case studies in Colombia and Afghanistan will demonstrate these discrepancies
in U.S. approaches to counternarcotics and counterterrorism and the elimination of both
threats.
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Case Studies:
The FARC, Cocaine, and Colombia

Colombia experienced extreme violence and political unrest in the 1940s and
1950s in the period known as La Violencia.48 This instability spawned guerilla insurgent
groups that, over time, organized themselves into the FARC (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia). The FARC began as an insurgency aspiring to institute communism
in place of the Colombian government.49 For the next twenty years, the FARC continued
to grow and spread its influence.
By the 1970s, a lack of resources and weaponry began to stunt the FARC’s
growth. As a result, the FARC turned to a lucrative trade within its controlled districts:
marijuana.50 The FARC began to tax the marijuana trade in its controlled districts; a
gateway action to the growth of its dependency on the drug trade. Simultaneously, the
1970s also witnessed the beginning of the cocaine industry as small businesses initiated
small exporting operations.51 Looking to make a dependable living while in a conflict
zone, Colombian peasant economies centered around “the first two phases of illicit
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production- the cultivation of coca leaf and its subsequent transformation into coca
base.”52
Over the course of the 1970s, the growing American demand for cocaine breathed
life into Colombian drug cartels, such as Pablo Escobar’s Medellín drug cartel.53 When
the U.S. urged Colombia to issue a warrant for Escobar’s arrest, the cartel declared war
on the state. This gave rise to cartel paramilitaries that adopted tactics of political
violence modeled on those used by the FARC. This rise of cartel paramilitaries wielding
FARC tactics translated into the rise narcoterrorism in Colombia.
In the following decade, the FARC experienced unprecedented expansion as it
involved itself in “kidnapping, extortion, coca-cocaine taxation, production, cattle theft,
[and] narcotics transportation along with money laundering.”54 To facilitate this
expansion, the FARC “would conduct military operations in order to gain access to key
pieces of drug trafficking networks” and create safe conditions for the production of
narcotics, particularly cocaine.55 While the FARC launched these guerilla campaigns,
larger and more organized narcotics trafficking organizations emerged in the 1980s.56
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Recognizing some correlation between the activities of the FARC and cocaine
traffickers, the former United States ambassador to Colombia, Lewis Tambs, popularized
the “Narcoguerrilla Theory” in the 1980s.57 The Colombian Narcoguerrilla Theory posits
that 1) the FARC dominates the Colombian drug trade; 2) the Colombian government is
fractured, lacks a coherent defense, and is incapable of combatting this threat; and, 3)
U.S. intervention is imperative to ending this threat.58 Through the Narcoguerrilla
Theory, the U.S. recognized the existence of the narco-terrorist symbiosis and attempted
to coordinate its agencies and executive departments to address shortcomings. From this
development in the 1980s and on, the Colombian Narcoguerrilla Theory justified and
drove U.S. intervention measures in Colombia thereafter. 59 However, the premises of the
Colombian Narcoguerrilla Theory and the lack of Congressional support for
counterterrorism in Colombia drove the U.S. to predominantly rely on counternarcotics
operations; believing that defeating the narcotics threat would also eradicate the terrorist
threat.
In the mid-1990s, successful US counternarcotics operations in Colombia broke
down regional cocaine cartels and allowed the FARC to assume dominance in the
Colombian drug trade activities, including: “Coca leave harvesting, transportation to
cocaine facilities, and finally transport of the final product to the narcotics cartels
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operating out of Mexico.”60 The U.S. Department of the Treasury estimated the FARC’s
cocaine trade profits in the billions; allowing them to not only supply and arm their
troops, but gain legitimacy as a power in the country.61 The U.S.’s efforts simply pushed
coca supply into the regions protected and taxed by the FARC. In this way, U.S.
counternarcotics efforts “provided the FARC with unprecedented opportunities to extract
resources from the cocaine industry to deepen its long insurgency against the Colombian
state.”62
The few U.S. counterterrorism operations in Colombia also empowered narcotics
traffickers and production participants. The U.S.’s counterterrorism mission “declared
interest in promoting democracy, the protection of human rights, and economic
development.”63 However, as counterterrorism operations cut lifelines for the FARC,
“they soon realized not only how important coca cultivation was to their peasant base, but
also that it could be cultivated as a new revenue source for their guerilla activities.”64 The
terrorist organization consequently turned to narcotics trafficking and sales as a new
source of cash flow.

60

Paul R. Cooper "Greed and Grievance? Why did FARC-EP Leadership Become Involved in the Illicit
Trades of Coca-Cocaine and Money Laundering?" Order No. 1556484, The University of Texas at San
Antonio, 2014. http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1541532599?accountid=10141.
61
Paul R. Cooper "Greed and Grievance? Why did FARC-EP Leadership Become Involved in the Illicit
Trades of Coca-Cocaine and Money Laundering?" Order No. 1556484, The University of Texas at San
Antonio, 2014. http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1541532599?accountid=10141.
62
Ibid.
63
David Schwam-Baird. "Frankenstein in Colombia: America's Policy Missteps and the
Paramilitaries." Journal of Third World Studies 32, no. 2 (Fall, 2015): 123-151,
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1789006416?accountid=10141 (accessed October 10, 2018).
64
Ibid.

26

The U.S.’s counternarcotics missions in Colombia gave rise to friction points
between the DoD and DOJ over jurisdiction. The main point of friction derived from
DOJ’s ambition to have narcotics traffickers extradited to the U.S. to stand trial.65 DOJ’s
extradition trials launched it into controversy as policymakers argued whether the trials
were an encroachment of Colombia’s sovereignty. This controversy led to a series of
activations, deactivations, and reactivations of the bilateral extradition treaty between the
U.S. and Colombia in the 80s. However, the Medellín Cartel began to threaten the
Colombian election process, and the Colombian government reinstated extradition in an
effort to bring traffickers to justice.66
Infusing the Colombian Army with monetary aid was the DoD’s first impulse.67
After some reluctance, Colombia and the DoD formed a specialized counternarcotics
battalion, consisting of 950 troops and 33 Huey helicopters, in the Colombian Army.68
The U.S. tasked this counternarcotics battalion with providing security for aerial
eradication operations over coca farms and consequently FARC strongholds.69 The U.S.
turned to a variety of counternarcotics operations, like aerial eradication, in the rationale
that wiping out coca crop would choke off narcotic profits and thus, substantially weaken
the FARC. However, the efforts backfired.
The “tactical successes in U.S. antidrug policies” fragmented cocaine giants into
small diversified paramilitary actors. Due to their small size and limited resources, these
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paramilitary actors lacked access to large imports of coca leaves and ability to export.
The FARC took advantage of the small-scale industry and aggressively taxed the cocaine
trade.70 While taxing drug traffickers, the FARC would provide protection to the taxed in
order to protect this source of income.
The adverse effects of the U.S.’s counternarcotics operations led the U.S. to shift
to a new hardline approach to counter the rise of the FARC. In July of 2000, DOS and
DoD launched Plan Colombia, a counterterrorism operation, to the Colombian
government. Plan Colombia granted aid to the Colombian government “to train and equip
Colombian military and police forces to combat drug cartels and guerillas, with a smaller
portion going to social programs.”71 Plan Colombia broke away from the trend of
separate and exclusive counternarcotics programs, and outlined a course of action for
cooperation between agencies and the integration of program mission sets. On the
surface, DoD communicated Plan Colombia to the American public as an effort in the
War on Drugs. However, the communication of Plan Colombia and its counternarcotics
operations were a proxy to counterterrorism efforts as Congress failed to support outright
counterinsurgency in Latin America. Plan Colombia, in reality, was a refocusing of
counterterrorism operations against the FARC.72
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To employ a greater breadth of tools to counter the FARC, the Bush
Administration renamed Plan Colombia to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) in
2001.73 This allowed Bush to cancel DoD restrictions on U.S. counternarcotics funds and
use these funds in both counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations. In application,
the funds increased the deployment of military advisors and U.S. defense contractors to
Colombia.74 This translated into a stark disproportionality of military assets to focus on
aerial crop eradication, and resources for socioeconomic and human rights programs.
The U.S.’s Plan Colombia succeeded in ending the reign of Pablo Escobar and
dismantling the Medellín Cartel. However, the Colombian cocaine trade survived and the
FARC fought to assert its dominance over the profits that Escobar and the Medellín left
behind. Through the successes of Plan Colombia, the U.S. “provided the FARC with an
important opportunity to expand its power, because it removed one of its principal
political-military competitors in the Colombian countryside.”75 Protecting coca farmers
and regulating the trafficking activities of cocaine granted the FARC grass roots
legitimacy across the country.
In the wake of the failing Plan Colombia, food security programs by NGOs and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) attempted to persuade rural
farmers away from coca production as part of counternarcotics.76 USAID and all foreign
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aid was subject to the Colombian government’s “zero-coca” policy; requiring each
community seeking aid to first exterminate all coca crop.77 Therefore, the farming
communities that were the least dependent on coca and the safest from the FARC could
gain aid, instead of the most affected communities.
However, USAID programs lacked great enough assistance for farming
communities to leave coca production in the long term. USAID could rarely offer enough
for the communities to meet their basic needs. This often caused the farming
communities to surrender any assistance and return to coca production.
In terms of overall outcomes of U.S. operations in Colombia, the division of
counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations hamstrung the U.S. in accomplishing its
goal of eliminating the threat of narcoterrorism. The lack of interagency structure and
cooperation led the U.S. to lose coherence in its strategy and ultimately depend on the
DoD. However, these results meant the increased strength of the FARC and growth of
cocaine trafficking in Colombia; the exact opposite of the desired end state.
Plan Colombia ultimately resulted in some territorial loss for the FARC, but did
nothing to eliminate the terrorist threat or eradicate the cocaine market. The FARC
continues to control approximately 60% of the country’s drug trade.78 In the past decade,
the FARC entered peace negotiations with the Colombian government, but a “new
FARC” movement threatens to rise and pick up where the original FARC left off.79
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However, this new FARC “now wear the insignia of the Virgilio Peralta Arenas Bloc,” a
drug trafficking organization. The establishment of the new FARC, donning a uniform
shared with a drug trafficking organization, signals a key development of the narcoterrorist symbiosis in Colombia: the threat is hybridizing.

The Taliban, Opium, and Afghanistan:

In the 1970s, the governments of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan instituted bans on
opium.80 To address the demand after the imposition of the bans, poppy cultivation
sprang up in more than half of the provinces in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the conflicts
with the Soviet Union and the internal struggle for communist or nationalist control of the
nation displaced Afghans and caused an economic fallout. With few options for
livelihood, farming communities turned to opium cultivation.81
By 1980, the growth of opium production in Afghanistan posed a predicament to
the Mujahideen leadership.82 Because the Mujahideen considered opium consumption
counter to their interpreted Islamic values, they could not contradict themselves and
support the market that sustained a vast portion of Afghan livelihoods. Instead of making
a definitive decision on their stance, the Mujahideen overlooked opium production and
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quietly accepted any profits.83 The first form of the narco-terrorist symbiosis in
Afghanistan came from this silent compliance. The profits made allowed the Mujahideen
and narcotics trafficking groups to invest in the improvement of their armament: such as
“replacing single-shot rifles with automatic weapons and light artillery.”84
Soon after, several prominent leaders began to embrace the cultivation of opium,
and taxed the production and refinement of heroine. In 1981, Nasim Akhunzada, the head
of the Helmand Province, issued a fatwa calling for the spread of opium cultivation as
part of a holy war against unbelievers.85 Instead of cooperating with narcotics traffickers
that traditionally controlled opium producing communities, Akhunzada set a precedence
and fought trafficking organizations to attain complete control of the trade. This
competition for sole control of the market would lead to the morphing of the symbiosis in
the de facto: the terrorists and narcotics traffickers benefit when the other leaves behind a
power vacuum.
During this critical period of the spread of opium cultivation, the Taliban assumed
control of Afghanistan. Precursor to their future transnational prowess, the Taliban
extended past Afghan borders into Pakistan in 1994. Like the Mujahideen of the 80s, the
Taliban control of the mid 1990s remained complicit towards the opium market. This
laissez faire approach on drug crop harvesting gave way to the Taliban’s need for
additional funding and political legitimacy. Seeing the profitability of the opium trade,
the Taliban began to require warlords controlling opium lands to pledge allegiance to the
Taliban and pay tax for the cultivation of opium. Simultaneous to the 10% tax on opium
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cultivators, the Taliban levied another 10% tax on opium traffickers.86 The Taliban
eventually rose these taxes to 20% and added taxation on heroin labs.
To the drug cultivators and traffickers, the high taxes presented themselves as a
blessing in disguise. Under Taliban control, drug traffickers enjoyed low transaction
costs, industry stability, and freedom from the unpredictable nature of drug lord control.87
However, the Taliban’s view on opium taxation took a turn in 2000 when the
leadership issued a fatwa declaring opium cultivation as “un-Islamic.”88 The fatwa
seemed counterproductive to the Taliban’s own domestic policy because it directly
targeted the livelihood of their base of support: the rural opium farming communities.
Although seemingly counterproductive, the Taliban issued the fatwa in an effort to drum
up international recognition for its sovereignty outside of its three supporters; Pakistan,
United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.89 The Taliban, notorious for its human rights
abuses and systemic support for the opium trade, lacked the international legitimacy it so
craved to strengthen their grip on Afghanistan. However, the fatwa failed to gain any
international acknowledgment for the Taliban as a legitimate power.
A year later, the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom to remove the
Taliban from control in Afghanistan. Understanding the opium traffickers’ relationship to
the Taliban, the U.S. government chose to formulate alliances that would counter the
Taliban’s influence. In this case, the U.S. weaponized the narco-terrorist symbiosis in
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order to counter the spread of Taliban control in Afghanistan. The U.S. cooperated with
narcotics traffickers to gain intelligence and target a common enemy.
The U.S., right out of the gate, resorted to use of force through the DoD to
accomplish its task. The U.S., along with NATO coalition forces, aspired “to establish
military alliances with regional warlords to help defeat the Taliban.”90 In exchange for
their alliance, the DoD overlooked opium cultivation and trafficking. The U.S. invested
millions into these alliances to provide assistance to fight the Taliban. The U.S. justified
this laissez-faire approach to opium cultivation by “arguing that that strategy would
facilitate information gathering, military operations, and the effort to win local hearts and
minds.”91 Namely, this strategy prioritized counterterrorism in the logic that countering
the Taliban control would also eventually root out the opium market.
The reliance on DoD counterterrorism action in Afghanistan placed government
agencies and Congressional action on standby for a later date in which the eradication of
the Taliban could also translate into the eradication of opium. Toppling the Taliban
regime also ended their fatwa ban of opium production. Because the U.S. effectively
removed the Taliban from leadership, there was a power vacuum ripe for the subsequent
occupation of narcotics traffickers.
Within a year of the U.S. invasion in 2002, Afghanistan produced the majority of
the world’s opium.92 Reassessing the weaponization of the narco-terrorist symbiosis,
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Lieutenant General David Barno, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, affirmed
winning “the War on Drugs was… necessary in winning the War on Terror.”93 The return
of mainstream poppy cultivation forced the U.S. to change its lax position to a hardline
zero-tolerance policy. This shifted the American counterterrorism focus to a
counternarcotics focus. However, instead of allowing the involvement of other agencies
in a coordinated effort, the U.S. redirected the DoD and its deployed Armed Forces in
U.S.- led crop eradication campaign in 2002.94 The Bush Administration primarily
utilized the Armed Forces in order to employ military equipment and personnel and
partner with Afghan counternarcotics teams.
Continued failures of crop eradication by U.S. Armed Forces led to a shift in the
U.S. policy actors involved in the counternarcotics mission. In 2005, the U.S. unveiled
the 5 pillar counternarcotics strategy; allowing agencies outside of the DoD to participate.
The State Department formed the Central Poppy Eradication Force, a task force of
specialized eradicators. The State Department and DOJ established the Counternarcotics
Justice Center, an Afghan-based court system specifically for all drug related cases.95 The
U.S. employed the Drug Enforcement Agency within DOJ to lead efforts advising
regional and local counternarcotics entities and special forces.
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Along with increased agency participation on the issue, the DoD tripled its
counternarcotics budget and updated its rules of engagement to allow U.S. troops to
support operations combatting traffickers in 2005.96
However, U.S. counternarcotics ultimately failed due to the extreme reliance on
crop eradication methods, even as the U.S. eventually made an effort to coordinate its
agencies. Afghanistan continues to produce more than 80% of the world’s opium.97
Both the narco-terrorist symbiosis and the U.S.’s counter missions took a
multitude of forms in Afghanistan; highlighting the dynamic nature of the symbiosis, and
the U.S.’s mismatching of effective efforts to combat the symbiosis. The narco-terrorist
symbiosis was first mutually beneficial to the Mujahideen and opium traffickers. Then,
the Mujahideen and later the Taliban sought complete control over the opium trade;
making the symbiosis about competition for supremacy. To counter the rise of the
Taliban, the U.S. first selected a counterterrorism approach in Afghanistan. With the
decline of the Taliban regime, narcotics traffickers inherited the power vacuum left by the
U.S.’s counterterrorism efforts in a manifestation of the symbiosis in the de facto. The
growth of narcotics traffickers prompted the U.S. to redirect its focus to counternarcotics
operations. However, these operations failed to root out narcotics traffickers as the U.S.
first consolidated all efforts within DoD, and then diversified missions among other
agencies.
Ultimately, the U.S.’s separation of counterterrorism and counternarcotics
operations, and its overreliance on the DoD caused it to fail in combatting the narco-
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terrorist symbiosis in Afghanistan. Today, the Taliban are involved in every step of the
production, refinement, and trafficking of opium.98 As the Taliban continues to vertically
integrate and gain a monopoly of the opium market in Afghanistan, the Taliban ebbs
closer to enveloping the opium trade within its organizational structure and thus evolving
into a hybrid threat. This is because, soon, the motivations and actions of drug trafficking
entities in Afghanistan will be inseparable from those of the Taliban. These drug
trafficking entities will exist in-house, so the Taliban’s greater motivations and actions
will include the behaviors of those drug-traffickers; hybridizing the two threats.
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Key Findings:

Common trends in U.S. policy-making behaviors arise from examination of the
case studies. In both cases, the U.S. resorted to and deployed the Armed Forces when a
threat presented itself. In Colombia, the U.S. turned to DoD to carry out aerial eradication
efforts, contribute arms and equipment to the Colombian government, and support
Colombian forces against first narcotics traffickers, and then the FARC. In Afghanistan,
the U.S. responded to 9/11 and the rise of the Taliban by deploying forces in Operation
Enduring Freedom and allying with narcotics traffickers to eliminate the Taliban threat.
Once narcotics traffickers gained prominence over the Taliban, the U.S. adjusted fire and
tasked the Armed Forces with leading eradication operations.
When the results from the use of force are less than successful, the U.S. then turns
to soft power nodes such as DOS or USAID. In Colombia, these soft power nodes were
USAID and NGOs focused on food security programs and alternative livelihoods to
undercut the FARC and detract from the dependency on cocaine. In Afghanistan, the U.S.
employed DOS and DOJ as soft power alternatives to work with the Afghan government
as it instituted its own eradication programs and court systems to counter narcotics
traffickers, in the hopes that the Taliban would fizzle out.
The case studies also demonstrated the U.S.’s tendency to act without
understanding the policies of host nations. In the Colombia case study, the Colombian
government imposed the Zero-Coca policy, which required communities seeking aid to
eradicate all coca crop from its premises. Consequently, the communities most reliant on
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coca harvest under FARC control could not receive needed aid. U.S. efforts through
USAID and other NGOs failed to detract coca farmers from production. The U.S. did not
match its aid assistance with the policy requirements of the Colombian government,
rendering the effort ineffective. Afghanistan presented a unique opportunity that the U.S.
neglected to recognize. When the Taliban issued the fatwa against the opium market, the
Taliban turned on their support base of opium farmers and traffickers. This breakdown of
bonds between the opium market and the Taliban afforded a cleavage for the U.S. to
potentially manipulate. The U.S. could have played on the fissure to pit the opium
traffickers against the Taliban in order to allow for mutual destruction. This sort of action
would target the narco-terrorist symbiosis directly. However, the U.S. missed this
opportunity all together through its negligence to understand host nation dynamics.
Multiple threats to national security presented themselves in both cases;
prompting the U.S. to prioritize which threat was more dangerous than the other. Given a
time frame in each case, the U.S. chose to render its complete focus to one mission set
instead of finding a means to integrate the two mission sets. In Colombia, the U.S. first
centered its attention on counternarcotics to eradicate cocaine cartels in Colombia, and
then shifted its efforts to counterterrorism operations once the FARC gained prominence.
Meanwhile, in the Afghanistan case study, the U.S. took the opposite approach and first
relied on the counterterrorism mission set to topple the Taliban, and then turned to
counternarcotics to combat the opium trade. However, no matter which mission the U.S.
focused on first, the division of counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts resulted in
failure of both mission sets as the U.S. could not effectively combat one threat while
neglecting the other. The U.S. failed to match its responses with an integration of
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counternarcotics and counterterrorism mission sets with the integrated threat of the narcoterrorist symbiosis. Thus, the logic of siloing the mission sets with the assumption that
the elimination of one threat will lead to the elimination of the other is problematic and
indicates a flawed application of the national security strategy.
The first step in our policy-making process in the national security strategy is
identifying the variable we wish to manipulate: namely the threat we seek to eliminate.
When confronted with the threats of illegal narcotics trafficking and the spread of
terrorism, the U.S. prioritized what it perceived as the greater threat to its existence given
the political climate of the time. In the case of the FARC and cocaine in Colombia, the
U.S. Congress turned away from concerns of the FARC’s rise and perceived narcotics
trafficking as the bigger existential threat. By consequence, the U.S. responded by
prioritizing counternarcotics operations in Colombia. Also, this choice to focus efforts on
eliminating the threat of narcotics traffickers occurred simultaneous to the public and
widely supported manhunt of Pablo Escobar. The U.S. relied on extensive crop
eradication in the hopes of exterminating cocaine in Colombia, and consequently the
supremacy of the FARC. In the case of the Taliban and opium in Afghanistan, the U.S.
chose to prioritize the threat of the Taliban’s spreading influence, and reacted by
prioritizing counterterrorism operations. The choice to implement aggressive
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan came in the aftermath of 9/11. The U.S.
mobilized armed forces and counterterrorism efforts to combat the Taliban and their
influence. The U.S. hoped that opium would die along with the Taliban in a future
economic upturn from the emergence of a democracy in Afghanistan.
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These trends in how we perceive threats and choose to prioritize one mission set
over the other drive the conventional logic of the U.S. in the policy-making process. In
the case studies, the U.S. understands the threats of narcotics traffickers and terrorists, but
also recognizes their reliance on each other in the form of the narco-terrorist symbiosis.
The U.S. operates on the conventional wisdom that efforts to combat one threat will
result in the elimination of the other threat. This logic suggests that the U.S. actively
recognizes the symbiosis that exists between narcotics traffickers and terrorists. This
logic fails because even in the scenario that the U.S. successfully weakens one threat, the
other threat strengthens as a result of a power vacuum in a de facto symbiosis.
Given this symbiotic relationship of terrorists and narcotics traffickers, the
conventional logic must be left behind to engineer an effective relationship between
counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations. However, U.S. defense policy finds
itself in a paradox of the differing mission sets of counterterrorism and counternarcotics.
Since both diverge in scope, actors, and desired end states, the application of
counternarcotics and counterterrorism presently translates into failure in both missions.
By prioritizing one mission set over the other, the U.S. fails to succeed in either. U.S.
policy must depart from the failed conventional logic of the past that assumes one threat
will decline if the other is eliminated. The U.S. must find a way to blend counterterrorism
and counternarcotics operations through understanding the threats and intricacies of
narco-terrorism.
This new approach would have to foster interagency cooperation through fusing the
efforts of the Armed Forces, intelligence community, the Justice Department, executive
agencies, and ally nations. The fused efforts of these entities must focus on not allowing
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successful hybridization of narco-terrorists. This means that the entities will have to
specifically target existing linkages and stop any new ones from forming that hold
together the narco-terrorist symbiosis. The blended interagency effort must find means to
compel terrorists and narcotics traffickers to compete against each other.99 The agencies
will have to find the divergence in identities and interests that create roadblocks to
hybridization. By formulating policy that plays on these differences in identities and
interests, the U.S. can break the bonds of the narco-terrorist symbiosis.
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Alternative Approaches:

Interestingly, proposed policies targeting narcoterrorism are hard to find. Instead,
there are many proposals for improving counterterrorism or counternarcotics efforts.
Those most likely to yield counternarcoterrorism (CNT) results focus on combatting drug
trafficking, and include: legalization of narcotics, the Eradication and Repression
Method, and Demand Reduction.
Academics, like Kan, entertain the idea of full legalization of narcotics as a
means to divert power away from the symbiosis; allowing government entities to regulate
the sale and distribution.100Legalization as an alternative to the status quo comes from
three assumptions: 1) “global drug trade is not going to disappear in the immediate or
even foreseeable future” 2) “Curbing global demand for drugs to an extent that would
significantly diminish the drug trade would mean an unlikely change in the nature of
human beings who routinely seek out some form of intoxication” 3) “reforming the
current global drug prohibition regime will reduce, if not eliminate, many… international
security challenges.”101 The argument asserts that “universal legalization of all drugs
would attack the illicit drug market head-on, destroying the profit incentive for drug
traffickers and placing control of the industry in the hands of national governments.”102
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The logic dictates that, through the acceptance of the American demand for narcotics, the
American government could regulate the supply, sale, and distribution of narcotics
entering the borders. In theory, bringing this illicit economy into the fold would shrink
the black market for narcotics and curtail the profitability of narcotics trafficking. By
legalizing narcotics at home, the U.S. would reduce demand and consequently undercut
the resources of terrorists and narcotics traffickers. However, full legalization of narcotics
in the U.S. is both politically impossible, and will still result in the same harms of the
current symbiosis.
There is no political traction currently present to legalize drugs in the United
States because of “the drawbacks and unknowns related to drug legalization.”103 In
addition to its unattainable nature, full legalization is an approach that only involves the
counternarcotics mission set. The guiding assumption for this counternarcotics approach
is: “If drug trafficking fosters narco-states… [and] emboldens insurgents and terrorists…
then relaxing the existing drug laws and conventions would appear to be a natural first
step.”104 However, the Full Legalization Approach misses the goal of targeting
narcoterrorism. As demonstrated in the case studies, the logic of targeting one threat to
end both is utterly flawed.. In this case, for example, we might expect narco-terrorism to
grow stronger in the black market space to fill demand for cheaper narcotics.
The Eradication and Repression Method is also an alternative approach. This
approach calls for a harsher cognate of crop eradication coupled with the instituting of a
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repressive regime that will hold strong to eradication measures at all costs. To employ the
Eradication and Repression Method, “the government must have control over the entire
area where eradication is to take place”, “to detect and eliminate new areas of
production”, and “ maintain a presence on the ground” to prevent uprisings and
insurgencies.105 To apply the Eradication and Repression Method, either the U.S. itself
or an entity it chooses to support will have to force a repressive regime over a finite and
bordered space in an attempt to root out narcotics cultivation and the subsequent
trafficking out of the space.
The economic calculus involved in the narco-terrorist symbiosis would render this
policy ineffective. Given a particular space enclosed by a repressive regime, true
repression requires inelasticity.106 However, when this repression is directed at the
narcotics trade, “the effort fails because there are no limits to either supply or demandboth are in effect, elastic.”107 This mismatch of elasticity would simply lead to drug trade
activities simply reconfiguring in a different space. Even if the Eradication and
Repression Method was possible, the U.S. would meet substantial roadblocks to
implementation: lack of support from the electorate and a deficiency of funds and
manpower to institute a repressive regime. The Eradication and Repression Method does
not get at the roots of narcoterrorism. This policy would likely lead to bolster support for
insurgency groups to protect and control the space where narcotics exist.
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Another alternative approach is Demand Reduction. Demand Reduction involves
a domestic policy focused on implementing and supporting drug treatment and
rehabilitation programs at home. Through these programs, Demand Reduction aims to
eliminate demand for narcotics through rooting out the addiction of users. While
attacking addiction is the center piece of Demand Reduction, public education against
drugs in community centers and schools also serve as a preventative measure. Demand
Reduction strategies “cost only a tiny fraction of what the United States now spends on
drug control,” but the results are disheartening.
Demand Reduction focuses on countering addiction in individuals who regularly
abuse drugs. According to the RAND Corporation, there are approximately three times as
many “light users” compared to “heavy users” of cocaine.108 Of those heavy users who
receive treatment in the U.S., only “13 percent of heavy users treated do not return to
heavy use.”109 Preventing drug use and addressing addiction involves a multitude of
resources and improvements to the current model of drug abuse treatment. Demand
Reduction is ill-equipped to expel the narco-terrorist symbiosis because it is purely a
counternarcotics effort instead of a counter-narcoterrorist response.
These alternative approaches intend to address the threat of narcotics trafficking, not
narcoterrorism. This is because these approaches emanate from the logic that targeting
one threat will lead to the undermining of the other. These approaches exclusively target
the supply and demand of narcotics in the hopes that they will also undercut the threat of
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narco-terrorism. This discussion of counternarcotics approaches in the academic and
policy-making worlds signal a propensity for reliance of counternarcotics as a means to
combat narcoterrorism. However, this propensity, as part of the conventional wisdom,
continues to fail in addressing narco-terrorism. The U.S. requires a new approach to
specifically target the narco-terrorist symbiosis.
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New Approach:

In 2009, the Obama Administration championed a new approach diverging from
ineffective past measures and the alternative approaches mentioned before. Obama, with
Afghanistan in mind, sought to promote the “development of alternative livelihoods that
focuses on rebuilding Afghanistan’s agriculture while eradication is greatly scaled
back.”110 The hope was that Obama’s counternarcotics strategy would tackle the linkages
between terrorists and narcotics traffickers by providing farmers with an alternative
option for crop. Once supply slowed and halted, the Obama Administration anticipated
“intelligence flows … enhancing the counterinsurgency effort.”111 Therefore, the
Administration supported using a counternarcotics strategy under the assumption that
attacking the narcotics trade would result in the weakening of terrorism.
The Alternative Livelihood approach focuses on the de-escalation of crop eradication
efforts and emphasizes education and assistance to farming villages to cultivate a nonillicit crop.112 The latter process is referred to as crop substitution. Through crop
substitution and economic aid, the U.S. aimed “to win the hearts and minds of” narcotics
farming communities.113 The hearts and minds motivation also translated into the easing
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of U.S. military presence in affected areas. This counternarcotics strategy became the
cornerstone of Obama’s counterterrorism strategy against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The Alternative Livelihood Approach requires long-term strategy and patience. This
approach is not a quick fix to break the bonds of the narco-terrorist symbiosis.
Essentially, this approach initiates efforts towards rural development. Rural development
calls for “broad-based social and economic development” with an emphasis on the
progression of human capital.114 Crop substitution will potentially lead the U.S. into a
long term pursuit to develop rural communities that rely on drug crop for their livelihood.
When it comes to rural development through crop substitution, “shortcuts do not lead to
sustainable policies that also mitigate conflict and enhance state-building.”115 In this
approach, the U.S. cannot shorthand efforts to campaign for alternative livelihoods. Crop
substitution and rural development are long term projects that require dynamic policies
and political momentum to succeed. If U.S. policymakers at all lose interest in this
venture, then the approach fails.
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Consequences of the New Approach:

Members of the Obama administration used the example that “the poppy farmer is
not our enemy… the Taliban are” to describethe Alternative Livelihood Approach. This
metaphor affirmed the need to target the livelihood of poppy farmers to combat the
Taliban. However, Obama’s Alternative Livelihood Approach is strictly a
counternarcotics approach to the narco-terrorist symbiosis. This is problematic as stovepiping efforts to combat the symbiosis results in a failure to address the threat directly.
This logic is rooted in the original framework for past failed U.S. policy responses: If one
threat is combatted, then the other threat will also suffer and be defeated. However, as
previously discussed, this logic is fallacious. Organizing counternarcotics and
counterterrorism exclusively of each other results in failure of both mission sets.
In application today, the U.S. and Colombian government popularly utilize black
peppercorn as a crop substitute for coca.116 In Afghanistan, the U.S. and Afghan
government distribute wheat seed to substitute for opium crop.117 However, the efforts
are failing.
In Colombia, issues with the agriculture industry as a whole plague success rates
of the Alternative Livelihood Approach. Because “Colombia doesn’t have a guaranteed
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minimum price for products” in agriculture, Colombian farmers fall victim to the
volatility of commodity prices.118 Without price floor policies and subsidies, farmers are
not provided any protections and must resort to the determined most lucrative crop option
to provide for their livelihoods. Black peppercorns are not the only option for farmers;
the U.S. and Colombia “promised money, seeds, and technology to help the farmers raise
everything from pineapple to pigs.”119 However, all of these substitutions are subject to
the poor conditions for the agricultural market in Colombia, and the power of the FARC
and cocaine traffickers. Regardless of the options, farmers are receiving significantly less
profit than when they cultivated coca.
Profitability of wheat in Afghanistan also hinders the success of the Alternative
Livelihood Approach. A typical Afghan opium farmer collects an income of more than
$3,000 annually.120 However, if this Afghan opium farmer complies with the Alternative
Livelihood Approach and cultivates wheat instead, he will receive an annual income of
less than $1,000.121 This margin of income loss drives Afghan farmers to continue
harvesting opium.
The Alternative Livelihood Approach fails its immediate goals of persuading drug
farming communities to substitute their crop for a non-illicit crop, and also fails in its
main aspiration to end the narco-terrorist symbiosis. The approach fails in its ultimate
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goal against the narco-terrorist symbiosis because its framework is rooted solely in a
counternarcotics approach, instead of an approach that integrates the counternarcotics and
counterterrorism approaches.
The failure of this approach warrants new policy options that set sights on
targeting the threat of narco-terrorism.
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Key Policy Recommendations:

In order for the U.S. to effectively eliminate narcoterrorism, the U.S. must present
a hybrid response to contend with a hybrid threat. However, the current U.S. policymaking framework is not conducive to a hybrid response. The current framework is a
product of our need to combat our greatest adversary to date: the Soviet Union. The Cold
War compelled the U.S. to hone every offensive and defensive capability to counter the
existential threat of the USSR; a unitary rational actor with peer force capabilities. The
U.S. can only conceive a unitary rational actor as a capable opponent. For this reason, the
framework is inherently neo-realist.
Neo-realism relies on the international state system as the independent variable to
change and policy-making. Whereas states are the actors recognized to consume a space,
states rationally act in their own interests to maximize utility. Through this assumption
that states are rational, the behavior of any given actor can be predicted. This neo-realist
policy-making framework focuses its scope exclusively to rational, sovereign states and
values behavioral predictions; missing non-state actors and the intricacies of decisionmaking.
The U.S.’s inability to understand the behavior of non-state actors hamstrings its
ability to authorize comprehensive policy. The U.S. fails to conceptualize the ways in
which non-state actors can operate outside of the constraints of institutions and confound
the state system. This leads the U.S. to “routinely underestimate the sophistication of
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adversaries”, fail to predict their actions, and misunderstand how to combat them.122 The
U.S. conventional wisdom is " based on extremely generalized data” and “the level of
detail does not even come close to approximating the complex reality of the problem.”123
This perspective blinds the U.S. from fully recognizing the need to address the narcoterrorist symbiosis, and the impending threat of hybridization.
A counter-narcoterrorism approach would not only deliver this hybrid response,
but also cause a paradigm shift in the framework of our national security policy-making.
A counter- narcoterrorism approach would address the complexities of targeting a nonstate actor that acts against the conventional perception of rationality. By departing from
neo-realism, the national security policy-making process can accept the legitimacy of
non-state actors as their own independent variables within the state system. The strategy
can therefore evaluate the goals of terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers as
actors threatening the U.S. and the international state system.
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-  

The U.S. Congress will establish a bi-partisan investigative commission tasked
with identifying when and where the Narco-Terrorist Symbiosis emerges, and the
level of risk for hybridization.

-  

The U.S. Congress will organize a series of hearings to assess which agencies and
entities are best capable to coordinate and combat Narcoterrorism.

-  

The U.S. Congress will pass legislation to require that the Executive recognizes
and responds to the threat of Narcoterrorism. ??

-  

The Executive will develop a Counter-Narcoterrorism Strategy that recognizes the
convergence of the terrorist and narcotics trafficking threats; creating a new
mission and departing from the past logic of siloing efforts into the
Counterterrorism Strategy and the Counternarcotics Strategy.

-  

The Executive will create an interagency working group that will serve as a joint
interface for preexisting counterterrorism and counternarcotics agencies to
collaborate with strategies and assets to fight Narcoterrorism.
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Conclusion:

This research concludes that, under unique circumstances where terrorists and
narcotics traffickers occupy the same space, a new threat to the U.S. national security
surfaces and warrants a new kind of policy response.
The set of interactions between international narcotics traffickers and terrorists
reflect the potential symbiosis between terrorists and drug traffickers. These interactions
can become bonds that make narcotics traffickers and terrorists indistinguishable. The
U.S. does not currently possess capabilities to combat narco-terrorism, leaving the hybrid
threat unmatched within the U.S. defense mechanism. In order for the U.S. to effectively
eliminate narco-terrorism, the national security strategy must add a counternarcoterrorism focus to its toolbox in addition to the current stove-piped counternarcotics
and counterterrorism missions.

56

Works Cited
Bjelopera, Jerome Bjelopera, and Kristin Finkela. “Domestic Federal Law Enforcement
Coordination: Through the Lens of the Southwest Border.” Congressional Research Service
(June 3, 2014). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf.
Bush, George W. “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.”
Capitol Hill, Washington D.C., September 20, 2001. https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
Caulkins, Jonathan P., Mark A. R. Kleiman, and Peter Reuter. “Lessons of The.” The Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, June 2002.
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/lessons_of_the_war_on_
drugs_for_the_war_on_terrorism.pdf.
Clarke, Colin. “Drugs.” Journal of Strategic Study 9, no. 3
(2016). https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.
com/&httpsredir=1&article=1536&context=jss.
Cooper, Paul R. "Greed and Grievance? Why did FARC-EP Leadership Become Involved in the
Illicit Trades of Coca-Cocaine and Money Laundering?" Order No. 1556484, The
University of Texas at San Antonio, 2014.
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1541532599?accountid=10141.
Cornell, Svante E. "The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 42, no.
6 (11, 2005): 751-760.
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0022343305057895.
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/213129737?accountid=10141.
Counterterrorism Coordination. The Inman Report: Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory
Panel on Overseas Security https://fas.org/irp/threat/inman/part08.htm.
Coyne, Christopher J., Abigail R. Hall Blanco, and Scott Burns. "The War on Drugs in
Afghanistan: Another Failed Experiment with Interdiction." The Independent Review 21,
no. 1 (Summer, 2016): 95-119. http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1798786156?accountid=10141.
Department of Defense. “Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism.” Joint Chiefs of Staff,
November 13, 2009. http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_26.pdf.

57

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats, Department of
Defense. “Counternarcotics and Global Threats.” Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/ASD-for-Special-Operations-Low-IntensityConflict/Counternarcotics-and-Global-Threats/.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “What Is the Fbi's Role in Combating Terrorism?.” Accessed
November 29, 2018. https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-the-fbis-role-in-combatingterrorism.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War On Drugs. Washington
D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 2010.
Francis Perl, Raphael. “Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists.” Lecture, DEA Headquarters,
Arlington, Virginia, December 4, 2001. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=3250.
Hanen, Kelly. "Doubling Down: Why Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations Should Be
Designated As Foreign Terrorist Organizations and As Significant Narcotics
Traffickers." American Journal of Criminal Law 43, no. 2 (2016).
Hesterman, Jennifer. The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus. Boca Raton: CRC Press: Taylor & Francis
Group, 2013.
Higgins, Hilary. “Counternarcotics to Counterinsurgency: Assessing Us Intervention in
Colombia, 1998-2002.” Master's thesis, Harvard College,
2015. https://gov.harvard.edu/files/gov/files/ir_6.pdf.
Ismail Sameem, “Afghan Farmers Stick to Growing Opium in the Face of Less Lucrative
Options,” U.S. News and World Report, April 29,
2018, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-04-29/afghan-farmers-stick-togrowing-opium-in-the-face-of-less-lucrative-options.
Jenner, Matthew S. "International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic
Solution." Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (Summer, 2011): 901-927.
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.2979/indjglolegstu.18.2.901.
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/906065074?accountid=10141.
John E. Thomas, “Narco-terrorism: Could the Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses Threaten
Our Civil Liberties?” Washington and Lee Law Review, May 2010,
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/66-4ThomasNote.pdf.
John Otis, “Colombia Tries to Get Farmers Away from the Cocaine biz. How's That
Going?” NPR, November 24,
2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/11/24/669221868/colombia-triesto-get-farmers-out-of-the-cocaine-biz-hows-that58

going?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=npr&utm_term
=nprnews&utm_content=2053&fbcli.
“Joint Publication: Counterterrorism.” Joint Chiefs of Staff 3, no. 26 (October 24,
2014). http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_26.pdf.
Kan, Paul Rexton. Drug Trafficking and International Security. Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield,
2016.
Leu, Amanda. “Fighting Narcoterrorism.” Joint Forces Quarterly, January
2008. http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/detail?vid=9&sid=a6706e
be-dc76-4d8b-99bb5db11c3a2e12%40sessionmgr4008&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1z
aXRl#db=aph&AN=31391038.
Liang Christina, “Shadow Networks: The Growing Nexus of Terrorism and Organised
Crime,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, September
2011, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/133082/Policy%20Paper%2020.pdf.
Maloney, Sean M. "On a Pale Horse? Conceptualizing Narcotics Production in Southern
Afghanistan and its Relationship to the Narcoterror Nexus." Small Wars and
Insurgencies 20, no. 1 (03, 2009): 203-214.
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/09592310802573640.
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/60010832?accountid=10141.
Maurer, Diana. “Drug Control Policy: Information On Status of Federal Efforts and Key Issues
for Preventing Illicit Drug Use.” United States Government Accountability Office, July
26, 2017. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Maurer-GAOStatement-ONDCP-7-26.pdf.
Mccoy, Alfred W. "Coercion and its Unintended Consequences: A Study of Heroin Trafficking
in Southeast and South West Asia." Crime, Law and Social Change33, no. 3 (Apr 01,
2000): 191. http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1308104878?accountid=10141.
Meyer, Josh. “The Secret Backstory of How Obama Let Hezbollah Off the Hook.” Politico.
Accessed December 6, 2018. https://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obamahezbollah-drug-trafficking-investigation/.
Newmann, William. Managing National Security Policy: The President and the Process.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003.

59

Nicholas Casey and Federico Escobar, “Colombia Struck a Peace Deal with Guerrillas, but Many
Return to Arms,” New York Times, September, 18,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace.html.
Peceny, Mark and Michael Durnan. "The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the
Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s." Latin American Politics and
Society 48, no. 2 (Summer, 2006): 95-IV.
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2006.tb00348.x.
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/200314886?accountid=10141.
Penn State University Libraries. “Terrorism.” October 9,
2018. http://guides.libraries.psu.edu/c.php?g=582994&p=4025429#s-lg-box-12491607.
Rajaee, Bahram, and Mark Miller. National Security under the Obama Administration. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Rydell, C. Peter and Susan S. Sohler Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand
Programs. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR331.html.
Sarkesian, Sam, John Allen Williams, and Stephen Cimbala. Us National Security:
Policymakers, Processes,. 4th ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008.
Schmid, Alex P. "Links between terrorism and drug trafficking: a case of narcoterrorism?." International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, January 27
(2005).
Schwam-Baird, David. "Frankenstein in Colombia: America's Policy Missteps and the
Paramilitaries." Journal of Third World Studies 32, no. 2 (Fall, 2015): 123-151,
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1789006416?accountid=10141 (accessed October 10,
2018).
Sessions, Jeff. “Attorney-General Sessions Announces Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism
Team.” The United States Department of Justice, January 11, 2018.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-hezbollahfinancing-and-narcoterrorism-team.
Spotlight On CIA's Centers. Central Intelligence Agency. July 2014. https://www.cia.gov/newsinformation/featured-story-archive/2014-featured-story-archive/spotlight-on-ciascenters.html.

60

Susan Virginia Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma: The Farc and Drug Trade in
Colombia,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, June 28 2017, https://www-tandfonlinecom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1338052
The National Counterterrorism Center. “What We Do.” Accessed November 29,
2018. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-what-we-do.
The United States Department of Justice. “Counterterrorism Section.” July 23,
2014. https://www.justice.gov/nsd/counterterrorism-section.
The United States Department of Justice. “Organizational Chart.” February 5,
2018. https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart.
Thomas, John E. “Narco-terrorism: Could the Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses
Threaten Our Civil Liberties?” Washington and Lee Law Review, May
2010. http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/66-4ThomasNote.pdf.
Tickner, Arlene B. "Colombia and the United States: From Counternarcotics to
Counterterrorism." Current History 102, no. 661 (02, 2003): 77-85.
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/200771130?accountid=10141.
U.S. Department of State. “Programs and Initiatives.” Accessed November 29,
2018. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. “Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats.” Accessed November 29,
2018. https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/ASD-for-Special-Operations-LowIntensity-Conflict/Counternarcotics-and-Global-Threats/.
Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Obama Administration's New Counternarcotics Strategy in
Afghanistan: Its Promises and Potential Pitfalls,” The Brookings Institution, no. 171
(September 2009), https://www-ciaonet-org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/record/17717?search=1.
Woody, Christopher. “Heroin Is Driving a Sinister Trend in Afghanistan,” Business Insider,
October 30, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/taliban-control-of-heroin-drugproduction-trafficking-in-afghanistan-2017-10.

61

62

